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COMMENTS
only to the most revolting forms of hard-core pornography. Anything
less than hard-core pornography is probably protected.
The Supreme Court undoubtedly realizes that these publishers of
"smut" are merely disseminators of dirt for money's sake and are totally
unconcerned with the exposition of new ideas. But the Court considers
the free speech guarantee so vital to a democratic society that it tolerates
such an assault on the morality of our society. The wisdom of such a bal-
ancing of interests should not be criticized too severely, if at all, when the
object of such publications is an adult audience. For upon maturity it is
presumed that a person has acquired the wisdom and judgment necessary
to discipline his percipient habits, and the law's concern should be only
with conduct that affects society directly, and not with the morality of
its individual citizens. What concerns this writer is the Court's hesitance
to recognize that an expression's distributive freedom is limited where its
primary audience is incapable of reasoned judgment. For although it is
presumed that an adult is capable of mature judgment, it is obvious that
the inquiring and immature mind of a child should be channeled and pro-
tected until it develops at least a youthful maturity. It is hoped that the
Supreme Court will soon affirm and define the position it took in the
Butler case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL
INTRODUCTION
In the last three decades we have witnessed the rise of two political
ideologies-first fascism and now communism-both bent on world domi-
nation. Although anathema to each other each shared the basic concept
that the right of the individual must be completely subservient to the
interests of the state. During these same three decades this country (par-
tially through its legislatures but primarily through its judiciary) has
adopted procedures which scrupulously protect the substantive rights of
the individual. It would seem that, viewing the abuses of the police state,
we in this country felt compelled to set up these procedural safeguards
less our rights too would suffer violation at the hands of the state. In
establishing these safeguards we have given the concept of individual
rights more meaning and significance than it ever had before in history.
Thus, for example, an individual's right against self-incrimination is
protected by the refusal of the courts to admit into evidence a confession
which has been coerced.1 Evidence illegally seized is also inadmissible,
1 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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thereby making significant the individual's right to privacy.2 Today one
convicted of a crime is no longer denied the right to appeal an error on
the part of the trial court solely on the ground that he cannot afford a
transcript of the record,3 thus rendering more important one's right to
equal protection of the laws.
This comment deals with one of the most important of these recent
procedural developments: the right of one accused of a crime to aid of
counsel. Without this procedural right, the others are little more than
empty words. For the layman by himself is often unable to make use of
his procedural rights either because he is unaware of them or because he
lacks the legal skill and knowledge to invoke them properly. Of what
value arc these rights if they are not effectively utilized?
This discussion is divided into three separate sections-(1) Rights at
Trial. (2) Rights Prior to Trial. (3) Rights on Appeal. Each part is further
subdivided into federal and state practice, in an attempt to give the reader
an overall view of the state of the law today with a prediction as to its
state tomorrow.
I. RIGHTS AT TRIAL
A. Federal Practice
The sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Prior to 1938, it was generally
thought that this amendment only guaranteed a defendant in a Federal
trial the right to secure counsel. In Johnson v. Zerbst4 the United States
Supreme Court, noting that this right is illusionary in the case of indigent
defendants, held that such defendants had a right to have counsel ap-
pointed in both capital and non-capital cases. Three years later, in Glasser
v. United States,5 the Court held that in all federal prosecutions it was
the duty of the trial court to advise the accused of his right to counsel
and failure to so do constituted reversible error. Today these decisions
are codified in Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: "If
the defendant appears in court without counsel the court shall advise him
of his right to counsel and assign him counsel to represent him at every
stage of the proceedings unless he elects to proceed without counsel or
is able to obtain counsel."
B. State Procedure
In state prosecutions, the accused must look to the state constitution and
statutes, operating in conjunction with the fourteenth amendment, for
whatever rights he has to the services of an attorney at his trial. Every
2Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 4304 U.S. 458 (1938).
8 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 5 315 U.S. 60 (1941).
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state, with the exception of Virginia, has a specific constitutional provi-
sion declaring that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to secure the assistance of counsel,6 and three states have constitu-
tions which provide for the appointment of counsel in the case of indigent
defendants. 7 While the statutes of the states vary greatly, the majority
provide for the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in both
capital and non-capital cases.
In 1960 Mr. Justice Douglas appended to his concurring opinion in
McNeal v. Culver8 a compilation of the states which by statute or con-
stitution provide for the appointment of counsel. Of the total number
compiled, thirty-five states provide for appointment of counsel on behalf
of an indigent in any felony case, whereas the other fifteen states vary
in their provisions, some making no explicit provision for appointment of
counsel. Of these, some make provision for appointment only in capital
cases, while the others leave the question of appointment to the discretion
of the trial judge.
The vast majority of the jurisdictions recognize that the right to counsel
is of little value to an individual accused of a crime if he is ignorant of
that right. Accordingly, either by statute,9 or judicial decision,10 the
majority of jurisdictions impose upon the trial court the duty to inform
a person charged with a criminal offense at, or prior to, his arraignment,
of his right to be represented by counsel. On the other hand, a substantial
minority of the courts' have held that the committing magistrate is under
no obligation to inform the accused of his rights.
The Federal Constitution also offers safeguards as to the appointment of
counsel in state criminal proceedings. It is important to note, however,
that these safeguards rest upon the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court has not as yet interpreted the fourteenth
as incorporating the sixth amendment. 12 Therefore the Constitution, as
6 For example, see ILL. CONST. art II, § 9 (1870).
7 IND. CONST. art. I, 5 13 (1851); Ky. CoNsT. § 11 (1891); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1947).
8 365 U.S. 109 (1961).
9 For example: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.26 (1961).
10 People ex. rel. Moore v. Hunt, 258 App. Div. 24, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 19 (1939).
11 State ex rel. Welper v. Rigg, 254 Minn. 10, 93 N.W. 2d 198 (1958); State v.
Jacobson, 28 N.J. Super. 226, 100 A. 2d 330 (1953); Pennington v. Smith, 35 Wash.
2d 267, 212 P. 2d 811 (1949).
12 In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court in a 6-3 decision explicitly held
that the sixth amendment was not incorporated into the fourteenth. On the other
hand, a growing minority of the Supreme Court has taken the view that the guarantee
of the sixth amendment as to assistance of counsel is embodied in the fourteenth amend-
ment, and that all persons charged with crimes are entitled to an attorney under the
sixth and fourteenth amendments. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350
U.S. 116 (1956).
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interpreted thus far, does not impose a duty upon the state courts, as it
does upon the federal courts, to provide counsel in every case where the
defendant is unable to retain an attorney.13
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does demand that
the state appoint counsel in all capital cases where the accused would, but
for such appointment, be unable to be represented by an attorney. 14 So,
too, in state proceedings involving non-capital cases, the fourteenth
amendment demands that the court appoint counsel for those whose trial
without counsel would be "offensive to the common and fundamental
ideas of fairness and right."' 5 This theory was established in Betts v.
Brady,16 where it was held that the Constitution does not guarantee every
defendant charged with a non-capital offense in a state court, regardless
of the circumstances, the right to have counsel appointed. However, in
cases where the defendant is so unduly prejudiced by the absence of
an attorney that he is deprived of his liberty, in violation of due process,
a conviction under such circumstances will be reversed. Thus, in De-
Meerleer v. Michigan,17 the defendant, a seventeen-year-old boy charged
with first degree murder (a non-capital offense in that state), was on the
same day arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Upon a plea of guilty he was neither offered counsel nor advised of his
right to retain an attorney. No evidence was introduced on his behalf
and none of the state's witnesses were subjected to cross-examination.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the petitioner had been deprived of counsel, a right which under the
circumstances, the Court deemed essential to a fair trial.
In contradistinction, in Gryger v. Burke' 8 the fact that the accused was
not offered counsel or told of his right to counsel was found not to justify
a reversal of conviction. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of the
fact that the defendant had eight previous convictions and was represented
by counsel in two of the prosecutions, held that as a habitual criminal he
must have known of his rights to counsel and therefore could not have
been prejudiced.
The logic for this distinction between capital and non-capital offenses
is not apparent. First, the fourteenth amendment speaks equally of life,
liberty and property. Secondly, it would seem difficult if not impossible
for the Supreme Court, looking at the record of the trial court, to tell
with any degree of accuracy whether or not the accused has been
13 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
14De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471
(1945); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
16 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
17 329 U.S. 663 (1947). 18334 U.S. 728 (1948).
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prejudiced. 19 "The right to have the assistance of counsel is too funda-
mental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice arising from its denial."'20
It has been suggested by one writer,21 basing his opinion on language
found in recent decisions, that the Court will reverse the decision in the
Betts case at the next opportunity which presents itself. A reversal would
seem to be more probable than not since the retirement of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Whittaker, two members of the court who
have definite conservative views. Thus, a defendant's rights would no
longer depend upon whether or not he was being tried for a capital or
non-capital offense.
Regardless of whether a defendant has a right to appointed counsel in
state proceedings, the fourteenth amendment gives him an absolute guar-
antee to be heard through his own counsel.2 2 Furthermore, he must be
given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel;
without this opportunity his right to be heard through counsel would be
worthless.23 In Chandler v. Fretag24 the petitioner was indicted in a
Tennessee court for housebreaking and larceny, punishable by a prison
term of three to ten years. At the trial he appeared without counsel and
pleaded guilty. He was then advised that because of three prior felony
convictions he would also be tried as a habitual criminal. A conviction
upon that charge would have subjected him to life imprisonment. He
asked for a continuance to enable him to obtain counsel on the habitual
criminal charge. The request was denied and he was convicted. He ap-
plied to the state court for a writ of habeas corpus and was refused. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the state court, holding that "re-
gardless of whether petitioner would have been entitled to the appoint-
ment' of counsel, his right to be heard through his own counsel was
unqualified. '25
19 "Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which, as here,
denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of
certainty, that the defendant's case was adequately presented." Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455,476 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
20 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1941). The words of this quotation were
written to apply to federal court proceedings. However, as Justice Black pointed out
in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (separate opinion), it would be equally
applicable to state proceedings.
21 Beany, The Effective Assistance of Counsel, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIoNs 39 (1959); In Crooker v. California 357 U.S. 433 (1958), four dissenting
Justices repudiated the doctrine of Betts v. Brady. This fact suggested to Beany that
had the case involved right of counsel at trial instead of prior to trial, the majority of
the Justices would have decreed the right to be an absolute one.
22 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Id. at 9.
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II. RIGHTS PRIOR TO TRIAL
A. Federal Proceedings
Prior to 1858, the defendant in a federal criminal prosecution was not
entitled to retain counsel at the preliminary hearing.26 This procedure was
altered in U.S. v. Bollman.27 Today the federal practice is that "the com-
missioner shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him, of his
right to retain counsel and of his right to have a preliminary examina-
tion.... The commissioner shall allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel. '28 Until the accused is arraigned before
the trial court the right to assigned counsel does not exist.29
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require only that the com-
missioner on preliminary examination inform the accused of his right to
retain counsel and allow him reasonable time and opportunity to consult
with counsel. It does not require him to assign counsel at this stage of the
proceedings. Rule 44 which provides for the arraignment of counsel was
"intended to indicate that the right of the defendant to have counsel as-
signed by the court relates only to proceedings in the court and, therefore,
does not include the preliminary proceedings."8 0
B. State Proceedings
The laws of the states in regard to the rights of an accused to counsel
prior to trial vary greatly. Some states have enacted statutes which allow
the accused to have retained counsel at the preliminary hearing.31 Other
states, through their courts, have declared that in the absence of a statute
the accused is not entitled to secure the aid of an attorney.3 2 Others again
have taken a contrary view.3 3 California, by statute, requires a judge to
26 In re Bates, 2 Fed Cas. 1015 (No. 1099a) (S.C.D.C. 1858).
27 24 Fed. Cas. 1189 (No. 14622) (C.C.D.C. 1807).
28 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 (b).
29 Council v. Clemmer, 177 F. 2d 22 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 880 (1949);
Setser v. Welch, 159 F. 2d 703 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 840 (1947).
3 0 Fed. R. Crim. P. 44 n. 2.
31 For example: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 15-87, 15-88 (1961); FLA. STAT. § 902.01-
03 (1959).
82 Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W. 2d 561 (1949); People v. Rebolledo, 93
Cal. App. 2d 261, 209 P. 2d 16 (1949); Roberts v. State, 145 Neb. 658, 17 N.W. 2d 666
(1945); Lyons v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 197, 138 P. 2d 142 (1943); Blanks v. State, 30
Ala. App. 519, 8 So. 2d 450 (1942); People v. Campos, 10 Cal. App. 2d 310, 52 P. 2d 251
(1935); People v. Crowley, 13 Cal. App. 322, 109 Pac. 493 (1910).
33 State v. Braasch, 229 P. 2d 289 (Utah 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 910 (1952); Ex
parte Barnett, 67 Okla. Grim. 300, 94 P. 2d 18 (1939); Phillips v. State, 162 Ark. 541,
258 S.W. 403 (1924); People v. Fuller, 68 N.Y. Supp. 742 (1901); People v. Napthaly,
105 Cal. 641, 39 Pac. 29 (1895).
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appoint counsel for an indigent at the preliminary hearing upon request. 34
The vast majority of the states have held that the accused is entitled to
retained counsel at the arraignment where he is forced to make a decision
as to his plea.3 5
The right to counsel as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment is
not limited to the actual trial; it extends to the pretrial stage, provided
the defendant is in fact prejudiced by the absence of counsel to such an
extent that it effects the subsequent trial.3 6 In Crooker v. California,37 the
petitioner asked for an attorney before confessing to a murder. His re-
quest was denied and he was subsequently convicted, the confession being
introduced as evidence. In a five to four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction, setting forth the principle that deprivation of
counsel in a pretrial proceeding is a violation of due process only if the
petitioner is thereby so prejudiced as to infect his subsequent trial with
an absence of "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice." The Court concladed that since the petitioner was a college
graduate, had one year of law school and knew of his right to remain
silent, he could not have been prejudiced to such a degree. The minority
of the Court expressed the opinion that the one accused of a crime should
be given the absolute right to consult with an attorney during the
interrogation.
In a recent case,38 a petitioner who was convicted in an Alabama court
for a capital crime appealed, claiming that the denial of counsel at the
preliminary hearing constituted a denial of due process. Under Alabama
law the following must be pleaded or waived at arraignment: the defense
of insanity, the plea in abatement and the motion to quash based on the
ground that the jury was improperly drawn. The Supreme Court held
that here the arraignment was so critical a stage of criminal proceedings
that denial of counsel required reversal even though no prejudice was
shown. Thus, where the arraignment and trial are closely connected there
is an absolute right to counsel, at least in capital cases. This certainly seems
to be the reasonable solution in the problem of right to counsel. However,
it would be a mistake to extend this absolute right to the interrogation
stage. "The only function counsel could have at this time of the suspect's
34 CAL. PENAL CODE § 859 (1962).
35 Winn v. State, 232 Ind. 70, 111 N.E. 2d 653 (1953); Ex parte Stone, 255 S.W. 2d
155 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); State v. Lindsey, 231 Ind. 126, 106 N.E. 2d 230 (1952); In re
Sobongy, 18 N.J. Super. 334, 87 A. 2d 59 (1952); Johnson v. State, 79 Okla. Crim. 363,
155 P. 2d 259 (1945); People v. Terry, 366 111. 520, 9 N.E. 2d 322 (1937). Contra,
People v. Crandell, 270 Mich. 124, 258 N.W. 224 (1935).
36 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
37 Ibid.
38 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1962).
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interrogation would be to instruct him to 'keep his mouth shut.' "31 This
would be so whether the information which the suspect had was incrimi-
nating or not. It would seem that this rule of preventing interrogation of
those who have relevant information would be disastrous should the court
ever adopt it. 4 ° At the interrogation stage the only adverse effect which
lack of counsel could result in is a confession. If the confession is coerced,
it will not be admissible and the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby.
If the confession is not coerced what social objective can we hope to
achieve by denying the police an opportunity to obtain it? Should we
adopt the rule espoused by the dissenters in the Crooker case, we would
in all probability create havoc in our law enforcement system.
III. RIGHTS ON APPEAL
A. Federal Practice
The cases prior to 1956 held that there was no constitutional right to
the appointment of counsel; 41 however, the court had authority to do so
at its discretion.42 Possibly this is the law today.
In Griffin v. Illinois,43 the Supreme Court of the United States declared
that a state's failure to provide a transcript of the trial to an indigent
defendant was unconstitutional. The rationale of the decision was that in
failing to provide a free transcript the state was denying appellate review
to a certain class of citizens, thereby denying both due process and equal
protection. By analogy, it would seem that it is a violation of due process
and equal protection for either state or federal government to deny ap-
pointed counsel to indigent prisoners in order that the transcript might
be used effectively on appeal. This is especially true when one considers
that an appellate hearing, dealing mainly with questions of law, is normally
within the province of an attorney.
Since the Griffin case there has been only one case decided which would
39 Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 480, 72 A. 2d 575, 583 (1950). The Court
went on to say: "It is well-known that the 'secret which the murderer possesses com-
mences to possess him' and that his guilty conscience exerts a tremendous pressure on
his vocal faculties. This is especially true when shortly after the crime's commission
there is a let down in the criminal's nervous energy and remorse is in the ascendant.
If a criminal, desiring to release his troublesome secret, is to be frustrated by action
of the state in providing him at the time with an advocate who will counsel silence,
the number of unsolved American murders will be greatly augmented, for he who
plans a murderous assault does not plan to have it witnessed by anyone except the
victim, and his lips, the felon quickly and permanently seals."
40 Beany, The Effective Assistance of Counsel, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN CItMINAL
PROSECUTIONs 39 (1959).
41 United States v. Sevilla, 174 F. 2d 879 (2d Cir. 1949).
4 2 Lovvorn v. Johnson, 118 F. 2d 704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 607 (1941).
43 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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indicate the direction towards which the Court is heading on this par-
ticular aspect of appointment of counsel. In Johnson v. United States,44
an indigent defendant appealed a trial judge's certification that his appeal
was taken in bad faith. Such a certification would have prevented him
from obtaining a free transcript, i.e., appealing in forma pauperis. The
Court of Appeals held that the defendant had no constitutional right to
the appointment of counsel on an appeal. Judge Frank, dissenting, argued
that the Griffin doctrine required that an attorney be appointed for the
defendant. The Supreme Court reversed and held, per curiam, that coun-
sel must be appointed to assist the defendant in preparing an appeal to
contest the trial judge's procedural ruling.45 Unfortunately, no reason for
the decision was given. It could be, as one court contends, 46 that the deci-
sion may well be grounded in some peculiar feature of the federal in
forma pauperis procedure. Nevertheless, the case is an indication, however
slight, of the direction in which the Court seems headed.
B. State Procedure
There is no general rule regarding the appointment of counsel to aid a
defendant in prosecuting an appeal where the conviction was in a state
court. Some state courts have been reluctant to make such an appointment
a matter of right because there would be a heavy burden placed upon the
bar if it was assigned to work on a deluge of appeals, 47 while others feel
that they are without power to do so, 48 and still others because of stare
decisis.49 However, a few courts, noting that the right to appeal would
be illusionary in most instances without appointment of counsel, have
ruled that such appointment is a matter of right where the defendant is
unable to otherwise secure counsel.50 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
taken the position that appointment of counsel is a matter of right where
there are reasonable grounds for appealing, and appointment of counsel
had been made in the trial court.5' Several states have enacted statutes
which provide for the appointment of counsel for prosecuting an appeal
in capital cases.52 Illinois by statute provides that the public defender in
44 238 F. 2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
45 Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
46 People v. Breslin, 8 N.Y. 2d 73, 149 N.E. 2d 85 (1958).
47 Ibid.
4 8 State v. Delaney, 332 P. 2d 71 (Ore. 1958).
49 State v. Garcia, 144 La. 435, 90 So. 649 (1919).
50 State v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 377, 75 N.E. 2d 551 (1947).
51Cundy v. State, 244 Wis. 506, 12 N.W. 2d 681 (1944); State v. Hudson, 55 R.I.
141, 179 Atl. 130 (1935).
52 MIss. CODE ANN. § 2505 (1961); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 494 a (1960); KAN. LAWS
ch. 282 (1951).
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both capital and non-capital cases shall "prosecute any writ of error or
other proceeding in review which in his judgment the interests of justice
require." 53
Several state courts have been confronted with the problem of whether
the Griffin case imposes upon the state the duty of appointing counsel
to aid the indigent defendant in his appeal in addition to the duty of
providing a transcript of the records. Thus far courts which have con-
sidered the question have unanimously held that there is no such duty.5 4
However, it has been held that the Federal Constitution requires the as-
signment of appellant counsel where the state is unable to provide a
transcript of the record of the trial.55
CONCLUSION
It has been thirty years since Po'well v. Alabama.56 Today it would
seem almost inconceivable that the highest court of a state would sanction
a conviction as this:
The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiment,
haled back and forth under guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime
regarded with special horror in the community where they were to be tried,
were put in peril of their lives within a few moments after counsel for the first
time charged with any degree of responsibility began to represent them.57
We have made considerable progress since the Powell decision. Today
in our federal courts a person accused of a crime must be told of his right
to counsel at his arraignment, and if he is unable to retain an attorney, the
court will appoint one for him. Many states have adopted similar
procedures.
It should be noted, however, that even in federal courts the right to
counsel is an absolute right only at the arraignment and trial stages. In
many states an indigent has no absolute right to appointed counsel (not
even at the trial stage) if the crime which he is accused of does not carry
the penalty of death. Thus while progress has been made, there is still
much to be done.
53 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 5604 (1961).
54People v. Breslin, 4 N.Y. 2d 73, 149 N.E. 2d 85 (1958); State v. Delaney, 332 P.
2d 71 (Ore. 1958); Brown v. State, 171 N.E. 2d 825 (Ind.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936
(1961); People v. Bly, 191 Cal. App. 352,12 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1961).
55 People v. Kalan, 2 N.Y. 2d 278, 140 N.E. 2d 357 (1957).
5 6 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
57Id. at 57-58.
